On March 25, 2026, the Ontario government announced that it would be expanding the HST rebate to lower the cost of new homes. Here's the full media briefing PDF. Since then, every developer, lawyer, and sales team in the city has been scrambling to figure it all out and incorporate it into their projects. This includes us.
Today on the blog, I thought it might be useful to do the following: (1) explain how I understand the proposed rebate program works (or will work, to be exact), (2) talk about how I'm seeing the industry respond to the announcement (naturally, there's been some criticism), and (3) shamelessly plug one of our HST rebate-eligible homes at Junction House.
First, I need to caveat this post by saying that, oh boy, I'm not an accountant or lawyer, and that this proposal is still subject to regulatory enactment. So, I could be wrong about something, the proposal might not get passed, or maybe something outrageous happens, potentially precipitated by a post on Truth Social. Do your own research. Talk to your advisors. Having said all this, the industry fully expects this to pass, and developers are already relying on the fact that it will, perhaps by this summer.
Second, it's helpful to understand how new homes are typically priced in the market and how the existing new home HST rebate works. Developers in the Toronto market typically price their homes inclusive of HST, but net of the current new home HST rebate. As it stands today, this rebate caps out at $24,000, translating to an effective HST rate that is lower than the current rate of 13%, depending on the price of the home.
Let me explain:
Price on the purchase agreement: $925,000 (again, this is inclusive of HST but net of the $24k rebate)
Base price excluding any HST = ($925,000 + $24,000) / 1.13 = $839,823.01
HST payable to government = $925,000 - $839,823.01 = $85,176.99
Effective HST rate = $85,176.99 / $839,823.01 = 10.1% (which is less than 13% because of the $24k rebate)
In practice, the way this typically works is that the buyer, who is assumed to qualify for the rebate, assigns it to the developer as part of the closing process. The developer receives the benefit of this rebate, and so they only need to remit the remaining 10.1% to the government. Importantly, this particular rebate is meant for people intending to move into the new home. If they are not doing this, then a separate rebate process applies.
Now, here's what's proposed for the new HST program, which is available only for purchases made between April 1, 2026 and March 31, 2027, and applicable to homes used as a primary place of residence or as a residential rental property:
Up to $1,000,000: Full 13% HST rebate (up to $130,000).
$1,000,001 to $1,500,000: Flat maximum rebate of $130,000.
$1,500,001 to $1,850,000: The rebate phases down proportionally from $130,000 to $24,000.
Over $1,850,000: The rebate is capped at the standard Ontario maximum of $24,000 (same as today).
Given that most developers have been pricing inclusive of HST, but net of the current rebate, there's some math involved to figure out what purchasers will ultimately be paying for a new home bought over the next 12 months. But for homes under $1,850,000, the answer is less than before! (More on this below.)
Another important question is how this will work given that the eligibility time period has started, but the proposal hasn't passed and isn't in force yet. The way we are thinking about it is generally in the following two ways.
If a purchaser is buying a new home and closing on it today, they will have to pay the HST as has been customary in the past, but then the expectation is that, once the proposal is enacted, the purchaser will get it refunded (as per the above). Going back to our $925k example above, the $85k would still get paid up front, and then remitted to the government, but then the purchaser would get it back, bringing their net price down to $839k.
If a purchaser is buying a new home today and expecting to close on it after the proposal is enacted, one reasonable assumption is that the proper protocols will be in place such that the purchaser isn't paying the HST upfront only to get it back later. In our example, they would instead be paying the $839k up front. Developers are contracting for this scenario today, but how exactly the paperwork will flow in the future remains TBD.
One of the unexpected benefits of this proposal, at least for me, is that it has me thinking more in terms of net prices, excluding any HST. And I like this better. I think it's a more transparent way to communicate with purchasers. We as an industry should use this moment as an opportunity to move toward this practice.
In fact, what I would like to be able to do is enumerate the following to buyers: "Here is the price of your new home. Now let's add the HST, development charges, education development charges, parkland dedication fees, community benefit charges, and so on." Because I think, only then, would it become clear to the general public how much we tax new housing.
Now let's talk more broadly about how the market is responding to this proposal.
One of the criticisms of this proposal is that it will only serve to increase developer margins. And indeed, this proposal does represent a cost reduction in development pro formas. But what I will say is that every single developer that I have spoken to is using this as an opportunity to reduce their pricing and pass along the savings (typically 1:1) to new home buyers. The reality is that the market is too soft to do anything else.
This is a perfect example of the cost-plus pricing model that we often talk about on this blog. Developers typically price based on their costs. Now that costs have come down (because of this proposal), they are lowering their prices accordingly. And those who do not follow suit will no longer be competitive in the market.
The market froze out in recent years because, suddenly, the price people were willing to pay for new homes was less than developers' costs. The floor had been reached. But now the floor has been lowered in a direct effort to clear out inventory and reset the market. It's a good time to be a new home buyer, and I have already started to feel a change in sentiment across the industry.
On that note, I would like to turn your attention to a penthouse suite at Junction House that we just listed for sale. It's a two-bedroom and two-bath home and, yes, it's HST rebate-eligible! It's one of my favourite suites in the building. If you'd like to learn more, reach out to Paul Johnston at Unique Urban Homes (paul@pauljohnston.com).
Every single real estate development project I have worked on has generally gone something like this:
Design the project.
Budget the project.
Realize: "Oh shit, this is way too expensive and will never work."
Cut out some of the parking (a loss leader on most projects).
Look for value engineering and other creative opportunities.
Repeat the cycle until the project works (hopefully).
This is so typical that if I went through this process and everything just magically worked, I would be immediately suspicious. This can't be. We must be overlooking something! The expectation is that the project isn't going to work until we, as developers, figure out a way to make it work.
This is what we mean around here when we say that "development happens on the margin." Projects are sensitive to even slight changes in market conditions. If rents soften, costs go up, and/or interest rates move in the wrong direction, that could be the end.
Current market conditions have only heightened this dynamic. More than ever, developers need to be both creative problem-solvers and disciplined managers because there's very little elasticity on the revenue side to help cover up any mistakes (if the revenue side even exists at all!).
Development is hard. But working through challenges is a big part of what makes it so rewarding. On that happy note, enjoy the long weekend, everyone.
Cover photo by Shivendu Shukla on Unsplash
In the olden days here in Toronto, approved development land used to sell for a premium compared to unapproved land. This was true because approved land meant you could start construction much sooner. And since time has value, this was worth something.
Today, this is far less valuable to developers (if at all) because, in most cases, the market does not support new construction. So, the land may be approved, but what does one do with it?
Rather than speed, I would say that the most valuable feature right now is the ability to be patient. Developers need to be able to stay solvent long enough for the market to return. But this does not mean that there isn't a cost to permitting, approvals, and lengthy pre-construction periods.
Here is a recent paper (that I discovered via Thesis Driven) by economists Evan Soltas (Princeton) and Jonathan Gruber (MIT) that asks: "How Costly Is Permitting in Housing Development?" What they discovered in the Los Angeles market is the following:
Developers have been willing to pay roughly 50% more for pre-approved development land (averaging about $48 per square foot).
The permitting process in Los Angeles accounts for about 40% of the time required to develop and construct a new housing project.
Approximately one-third of the gap between home prices and construction costs can be explained by permitting costs and delays.
This last point is an interesting one to focus on because it tells you how much regulatory fat there is in the system. In a perfectly free and efficient market, the market price of a home should, in theory, be roughly equal to the cost of the land, construction costs, and the developer's margin.
When you have a massive gap between the cost of the physical materials and labour required to build the home and the price of the home, it means that there are other costs being shouldered. The paper refers to some of these as "pure wait" (time) and "capitalized hassle" (dealing with bullshit).
This is an important way to think about the efficiency of housing markets, because minimizing the gap is a clear way to make housing more affordable.
Cover photo by Josh Miller on Unsplash