
It turns out that the injury and fatality rates on the Autobahn -- measured per billion vehicle kilometers traveled -- are actually relatively low compared to urban and rural road classes. It is also relatively low compared to international standards. Here is a 2012 comparison, also via Wikipedia:

Europe as a whole does very well in this regard (not that this specifically addresses Autobahn safety). Generally, fatalities have declined significantly over the last few decades. Here is a chart from the World Health Organization:

What is clear to me after seeing this data, though, is that the greater problem looks to exist outside of our highways and motorways.
As I am sure you have all heard, there's a lot of debate in New York right now (city and state) about whether they should reject Amazon's decision to open up a new headquarters in Queens.
Urbanist Richard Florida has been arguing that one of the richest companies in the world shouldn't be receiving taxpayer subsidies and that Amazon should do the right thing here. They should open up in New York but without any inducements.
As a counter argument, Kenneth Jackson, professor of history at Columbia University, recently opined that this is actually business as usual. American cities have a long history of competing for companies because the benefits outweigh the costs over the longer term.
Here is an excerpt from his op-ed in the New York Times:
They are right about one thing. It is absurd that any city would agree to such a deal. But this is how the game is played. Paying companies to relocate has been the American way since 1936, when Mississippi established the nation’s first state-sponsored economic development plan. Under that plan, since followed by many other jurisdictions, cities and states agreed to pay companies to relocate by promising them new factories and low or nonexistent taxes. With those inducements, numerous businesses relocated in the decades after World War II, usually from the union-dominated Northeast and Midwest to the business-friendly South.
Perhaps this would make a good debate topic for Kialo.
Update: Amazon just cancelled its plans for a corporate HQ in NYC.

According to Amazon's recent annual 10-K filing, the company leased and owned (most of their space is leased) about 288,419,000 square feet of space around the world at the end of 2018. Of this number, about 80% is used for "fulfillment, data centers, and other." Amazon doesn't break out this line item any further, but GeekWire reckons that a good 3/4 of their real estate is dedicated to their fulfillment warehouses.
Here's the full summary of their facilities (from the 10-K filing):

Given that fulfillment is such a large share of their properties, I am most interested in understanding the geography of their warehouses and how that impacts their core value proposition, which is largely all about convenience.
In April 2017, Jean-François Houde (of Cornell), Peter Newberry (of Penn State), and Katja Seim (of UPenn) published a paper on this very topic called, "Economies of Density in E-Commerce: A Study of Amazon’s Fulfillment Center Network." There's also this Knowledge@Wharton podcast on the paper if you're looking for a quicker listen or read.
In the early days of online retail, the decision of where to warehouse had meaningful tax implications. Because (in most cases in the US?) you only had to collect sales tax if you had a physical presence in the same location as your purchasers.
As that changed, it then made more sense to create a broader distribution network and minimize the distance between fulfillment center and purchaser. By 2016, Bloomberg estimated that nearly 78 million Americans lived in a zip code where Amazon offered free same-dame delivery. That number has obviously increased since.
And in the paper "Economies of Density", they discovered the following cost savings as a result of Amazon's growing fulfillment network:
We find that Amazon saves between $0.17 and $0.47 for every 100-mile reduction in the distance of shipping goods worth $30. In the context of its distribution network expansion, this estimate implies that Amazon has reduced its total shipping cost by over 50% and increased its profit margin by between 5 and 14% since 2006. Separately, we demonstrate that prices on Amazon have fallen by approximately 40% over the same period, suggesting that a significant share of the cost savings have been passed on to consumers.
The interesting question for real estate people and city builders -- which is brought up in the Knowledge@Wharton podcast but is difficult to answer -- is whether there are diminishing returns to this "economies of density" phenomenon. In other words, how dense does Amazon's fulfillment network want to be?
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