Berlin just approved a five year "rent freeze" on apartments in the German capital. The rent caps will be implemented on January 1, 2020, but will apply retroactively to all rental agreements from June 18, 2019 onward (which is when the decision was made). It is estimated that this new law will apply to some 1.5 million apartments.
The move is in response to rapidly rising apartment rents, which grew about 12% in 2017 alone. So I can appreciate where this is coming from.
From what I have read, it will not apply to new construction, which is the first thing I checked when I saw the decision. That would have almost certainly choked off any new apartment construction in the city. With a capped top line, it wouldn't take long for costs to increase and make new rental construction infeasible.
That said, a similar squeeze is liable to happen for existing buildings. It is one thing to cap rents (revenue), but what about utility, maintenance, labor, and other operating costs (expenses)? As costs rise and operating margins tighten, it can become exceedingly difficult to reinvest in, or even maintain, an apartment building.
Berlin just approved a five year "rent freeze" on apartments in the German capital. The rent caps will be implemented on January 1, 2020, but will apply retroactively to all rental agreements from June 18, 2019 onward (which is when the decision was made). It is estimated that this new law will apply to some 1.5 million apartments.
The move is in response to rapidly rising apartment rents, which grew about 12% in 2017 alone. So I can appreciate where this is coming from.
From what I have read, it will not apply to new construction, which is the first thing I checked when I saw the decision. That would have almost certainly choked off any new apartment construction in the city. With a capped top line, it wouldn't take long for costs to increase and make new rental construction infeasible.
That said, a similar squeeze is liable to happen for existing buildings. It is one thing to cap rents (revenue), but what about utility, maintenance, labor, and other operating costs (expenses)? As costs rise and operating margins tighten, it can become exceedingly difficult to reinvest in, or even maintain, an apartment building.
Over the weekend I stumbled upon this illustrated Medium post by Alfred Twu comparing sloped and flat roofs. The argument is that these two roof types are coded. In this part of the world, at least, sloped roofs signal low-rise "house" and flat roofs signal big city "high-rise."
I'm not yet convinced of this association with height, or of all the claims made in the article. Did New York City really make the flat roof commonplace in our cities? But the idea that a roofline can trigger certain associations -- or even become divisive -- is a fascinating one.
Over the weekend I stumbled upon this illustrated Medium post by Alfred Twu comparing sloped and flat roofs. The argument is that these two roof types are coded. In this part of the world, at least, sloped roofs signal low-rise "house" and flat roofs signal big city "high-rise."
I'm not yet convinced of this association with height, or of all the claims made in the article. Did New York City really make the flat roof commonplace in our cities? But the idea that a roofline can trigger certain associations -- or even become divisive -- is a fascinating one.
Wired's oral history of how the London startup scene came to be is a good reminder that, typically, a city needs some great big exits (acquisition or IPO) to really kickstart an ecosystem. In the case of Silicon Valley, you could perhaps trace things back to Fairchild Semiconductor (1950s). But a more recent example of this phenomenon would be the PayPal Mafia, whose members have gone on to found Tesla, LinkedIn, YouTube, and other companies that you may have heard of.
Put simply: success begets success. When a startup does really well and the founders and employees of that company get rich, it is likely that many will go on to found/fund other successful companies in that same city. In the case of London, that catalytic startup was arguably Skype (at least according to Wired). Microsoft acquired the company in 2011 for $8.5 billion, giving birth to the Skype Mafia. Of course, that wasn't the only ingredient, but it sure helped (excerpt from Wired):
Since 2008, according to data compiled by Dealroom.co, the UK has created 60 unicorns (tech companies valued at $1bn or more) – 35 per cent of the 169 created across Europe and Israel. In the past three years, the UK has created more unicorns (25) than France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden combined (19). And London has produced 23 unicorns with a combined value of $132bn, compared with Berlin’s eight, worth $32bn.
The world has changed since Skype was founded. It's now cool to be doing a startup. But given that every city seems to be trying to establish a thriving startup scene, I think it's valuable to point out just how important a single big exit can be, not just for the people within the company, but for the broader city. Easier said than done, right?
Take, for example, Am Fischtal in Berlin. On one side of the street you have, still to this day, homes with flat roofs. And on the other side you have homes with sloped roofs. This clean divide is the result of a supposed "roof war" that took place during the Weimar Republic.
At this moment in time in the suburbs of Berlin, the kind of roof you chose to live under was a proclamation of your political orientation. I'm not sure roofs have as much gravitas as they did in the 1920's on Am Fischtal, but they still do say something.
Wired's oral history of how the London startup scene came to be is a good reminder that, typically, a city needs some great big exits (acquisition or IPO) to really kickstart an ecosystem. In the case of Silicon Valley, you could perhaps trace things back to Fairchild Semiconductor (1950s). But a more recent example of this phenomenon would be the PayPal Mafia, whose members have gone on to found Tesla, LinkedIn, YouTube, and other companies that you may have heard of.
Put simply: success begets success. When a startup does really well and the founders and employees of that company get rich, it is likely that many will go on to found/fund other successful companies in that same city. In the case of London, that catalytic startup was arguably Skype (at least according to Wired). Microsoft acquired the company in 2011 for $8.5 billion, giving birth to the Skype Mafia. Of course, that wasn't the only ingredient, but it sure helped (excerpt from Wired):
Since 2008, according to data compiled by Dealroom.co, the UK has created 60 unicorns (tech companies valued at $1bn or more) – 35 per cent of the 169 created across Europe and Israel. In the past three years, the UK has created more unicorns (25) than France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden combined (19). And London has produced 23 unicorns with a combined value of $132bn, compared with Berlin’s eight, worth $32bn.
The world has changed since Skype was founded. It's now cool to be doing a startup. But given that every city seems to be trying to establish a thriving startup scene, I think it's valuable to point out just how important a single big exit can be, not just for the people within the company, but for the broader city. Easier said than done, right?
Take, for example, Am Fischtal in Berlin. On one side of the street you have, still to this day, homes with flat roofs. And on the other side you have homes with sloped roofs. This clean divide is the result of a supposed "roof war" that took place during the Weimar Republic.
At this moment in time in the suburbs of Berlin, the kind of roof you chose to live under was a proclamation of your political orientation. I'm not sure roofs have as much gravitas as they did in the 1920's on Am Fischtal, but they still do say something.
