Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.
The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) just published its latest housing supply report for Canada’s 6 largest city regions (downloadable over here).
One figure that stands out is the increase in housing starts in the Calgary CMA — it was up almost 63% last year compared to 2020. This is a positive indicator for that market.
It’s also worth mentioning that Calgary’s supply is more evenly split between low-rise and apartment housing. This is in contrast to markets like Toronto, where 3/4 of all new housing is now “apartment”, and in Montreal, where the percentage is even higher.
My view is that it’s time to get more granular with our reporting of higher density housing. In the above example, we are showing 3 categories for grade-related housing and only 1 for anything outside of that.
This is our national bias toward low-rise housing coming through.
Deeply affordable housing is mostly infeasible to build.
This is why you don’t see the market naturally building this kind of housing on its own. It, for the most part, doesn’t make any economic sense to do so. So this is also why the US has fabricated things like low-income housing tax credits. They are a way to make up the economic shortfall that exists with low-income rental housing and get the private sector building this kind of housing.
We sometimes try to convince ourselves — or maybe it is a way of shirking responsibility — that there can be such a thing as no-cost affordable housing through things like inclusionary zoning. But I think we all know that there’s no such thing as a free lunch. Somebody is ultimately going to need to pay. The big question, of course, is who should that be?
By definition, we acknowledge that the people who will ultimately live in these affordable homes cannot afford to pay market rates. So by default, the subsidies will need come from somewhere else. But again, from where and from who? Should it be specific people who pay or should it be mostly everyone who pays?
If we return to the Toronto building industry’s favorite topic right now — development charges — you’ll see that under the current rates, every new 2 bedroom or larger apartment that is constructed must pay $3,727 toward affordable housing. Under the proposed rates, this will increase to $12,545 for every new large apartment. It’s by far the largest proposed percentage increase (237%) and also one of the largest service items.
This raises two interesting philosophical questions.
One, should the buyers of new housing be responsible for contributing to affordable housing in this way? Because what we are in effect saying to these people is, “Hey, you can afford to buy a new market rate home, so we’re going to collect some additional money from you — $12,545 to be exact — so that we can try and help those that aren’t in the same position as you. We’re also going to mandate additional affordable homes within your building and we’d like you to subsidize those too.” This is one way to redistribute wealth.
But if the goal is to try and create more broad-based affordability, an alternative approach might be, “Hey, you already own a home and it has gone up a lot in value, so we’re going to collect some additional money from you over time so that we can try and help those that aren’t in the same position as you.” This would be the property tax approach. It’s probably not perfect, but might it be a more fair and equitable way to redistribute wealth?
The second interesting philosophical question has to do with whether this is consistent with the dogma that growth should pay for growth. The idea behind development charges (also known as impact fees in some parts of the world) is that they should pay for the cost of new development. This makes complete sense. When you build new housing you certainly need some additional stuff — everything from additional school capacity to emergency services.
But the question here is whether the construction of new housing in and of itself creates a direct need for more affordable housing, and therefore should be charged for it. Asked in the opposite way, if you weren’t building this new housing, would you then no longer need this affordable housing, just like you no longer need that additional school capacity?
This is definitely not the case. In fact, I would argue that the opposite is true. If you don’t build any new housing in a growing city, you actually exacerbate the problem of affordability. So here’s a provocative thought. Rather than a charge, should this affordable housing line item actually be a credit towards each new project given that it benefits affordability?
While it may not make any economic sense to build affordable housing, I think that many of us would agree that it makes a lot of social sense to build affordable housing. We know that our cities are at their best when they are both diverse and inclusive. The problem is that we can’t agree on who should pay for it.
Here are a few Ontario / Toronto housing supply charts taken from this recent blog post by Mike Moffat (an assistant professor at Ivey Business School):
So what do these tell us?
Well, 2015 was a banner year for the supply of new apartments/condominiums in the City of Toronto. And supply, in general, has been ticking upward for apartments across the province.
But if you’re in the market for a new single-detached, semi-detached, or row house, supply is on the decline in the Toronto CMA. You’re likely going to have to go further out for that.
This, of course, makes sense. The Toronto CMA has been built out. Most of the new growth is now going to need to take place through intensification, which usually means apartments and condominiums.
Though obvious, I think all of this is an important reminder. Because the more difficult and the more expensive we make it to build in our already built-up areas, the more we are encouraging sprawl in “Ontario outside of Toronto CMA.”
At the same time, we are also making it more financially challenging for families to remain in the city. We can talk all we want about 3-bedroom suites and ways to make them more accommodating to children, but that doesn’t mean much if people can’t afford them.
This Twitter thread by UC Davis Law Professor, Chris Elmendorf, is a good reminder that there can be a meaningful difference between actual completed homes and zoned land that might one day becoming new housing.
The point he makes is as follows: The state of California’s housing needs allocation for the city of San Francisco is approximately 80,000 new homes over the next decade. In the past, cities could demonstrate that they were able to meet these targets through, as I understand it, some fairly loose assumptions. But more recently, amendments have made it such that the probability of new homes actually getting built needs to be considered.
San Francisco has been doing this and, according to Chris, the conclusion was that the city should upzone portions of the city — primarily on the west side — to allow for some 22,000 new homes. Sounds cool. But as part of this process, the city also hired an outside consultant to run indicative pro formas and assess overall development feasibility. This is what they found:
I haven’t seen any of the actual numbers, but what this chart is saying is that nobody is going to develop on the west side of the city no matter what entitlements you put in place (tier 3 and tier 4 market areas). The only new development that is likely to take place is high-rise development over 24 storeys in the highest value submarkets (tier 1 and tier 2 market areas).
Based on this, the 22,000 new homes figure is probably closer to 0 new homes.
The great housing debate continues: Are we building enough housing, or are we not?
Right now the media is talking about a new report from the Union of B.C. Municipalities, which is claiming that cities in British Columbia are actually building enough housing to keep pace with population demand.
Between 2016 and 2021, the province’s population grew by 7.6% and the number of new dwellings grew by 7.2%, according to the report. So supply appears to be lining up with demand.
One problem with this robust analysis is that many people, including the Housing Minister, don’t agree. Here’s an excerpt from the Globe and Mail:
“The overly naive analysis comparing housing to population growth to declare the adequacy of our housing supply fails to understand that housing and population growth are intimately related,” said statistics analyst Jens von Bergmann, a regular decoder of housing statistics for Vancouver and Canada. “It’s a slap in the face of those who have been pushed out, or those who failed to move here, because of the unavailability of housing.”
And on a related note, here is a recent piece by Shawn Micallef (Toronto Star) talking about why the left can’t get Toronto’s housing right.
I just discovered a new alliance of non-partisan, non-profit resident and ratepayer groups in the Greater Toronto Area that have come together in opposition of what they see as “unregulated overdevelopment and the lack of sensible growth vision for the GTA.” If you’d like to read through their public letter to the Premier of Ontario, Doug Ford, you can do that over here.
In it you will learn that the Toronto region is vying desperately for the title of the most densely populated place on earth by trying to compete with already established locales like the slums of Mumbai and Monk Kok in Hong Kong. One has to admire ambition.
But what is not clear to me is what exactly “sensible, balanced, affordable, and livable developments” should look like. Should we quash our low-rise “Neighbourhood” designations (the majority of our land area) and instead blanket the region with mid-rise buildings similar to Paris? This is one option and, by the way, Paris is far denser than Toronto (relevant reading here and here).
Or should we maintain our low-rise “Neighbourhoods” exactly as they are and simply reduce overall housing supply by limiting height and/or density at our transit stations? Is this the ask? I’m not sure. But this is a good question for city builders: What should sensible, balanced, affordable, and livable development look like? Is the 33-storey building that I live in sensible?
When I was living in Philadelphia as a graduate student, new development was seen as a bit of a gift. I remember developers telling me that it costs the same to build in Philly as it does in New York, except that the rents are obviously a fraction in the former relative to the latter. So it was tough to make projects pencil.
At the same time, Philadelphia had a 10-year residential tax abatement program in place. I think it’s still in place, but it may have been modified since I was there. Either way, it was essentially an incentive to develop or redevelop existing residential properties. In the case of a renovation, the taxes associated with any improvements were what got abated for the 10 years.
Put differently, it was an invitation to gentrify. Come buy an old row home, fix it up, and then don’t pay any additional property taxes on those improvements. This was the way things felt at the time. So it was interesting to learn today that Philly’s current development boom is about to get throttled down with a new mandatory inclusionary zoning policy that will take effect later this year. Gentrification, it would now seem, is a problem.
The policy requires that 20% of the units in any new housing development (with 10 or more units) must be affordable for at least a 50-year period. For rental households, affordability means 40% of the area median income (AMI). And for owner-occupied households, it means 60% of AMI.
I have already said pretty much everything I can say about inclusionary zoning. But one of the unique things about Philly’s policy is that it is only going to apply to two of its Council Districts. It is not a citywide policy. This is going to create a strong disincentive to develop in these areas, and will likely force new development into surrounding ones. But maybe that’s part of the point.
Somebody on Twitter responded to my recent post about inclusionary zoning and asked: Aren’t all the upzonings that the City is already doing a kind of density bonus? In other words, and this is me elaborating here, why is there an economic “shortfall?” Why does there need to be any other sort of subsidy in order to mitigate the economic impacts of inclusionary zoning?
A density bonus can mean and can be used in a number of different contexts. Sometimes it is used as an incentive with landowners, whereby they get a bonus on top of their sale price if the developer manages to achieve a certain amount of density on the site. But in this particular case — IZ subsidies — we’re talking about something else.
We’re talking about density above and beyond what you might normally achieve on a particular site in order to directly offset — maybe partially or maybe entirely — the economic shortfall brought about by inclusionary zoning. The fact that upzonings are happening all over the city doesn’t necessarily qualify them as bonuses. In the case of Toronto, the market is just responding to out-of-date zoning.
Here’s a specific example.
Let’s say you have a development site with in-place zoning that would allow you to build 20,000 sf of density. This is the as-of-right or by-right density. No need to rezone the site. Just file your building permits and you’re off making things. If this is the most you could build, then the market would value the land based on this density. As we have talked about before, land is the residual claimant in a development pro forma.
However, if the zoning was out of date and it was fairly clear that one could rezone the site and build up to 100,000 sf, then the market would no longer value the site based on its in-place zoning. It would instead value it based on its future expected density. Again, because land is the residual claimant, more density = higher land value.
In this second scenario, the additional 80,000 sf is, in my view, not a density bonus. Give or take a bit here and there, it is the density that everyone is generally expecting. The market has already priced it in. A true bonus / subsidy, would be something above and beyond the base of 100,000 sf. Something that is only available to developers if they do X — which could be build affordable housing.
Maybe the bonus is perfectly tuned to exactly offset the economic drag of doing X, or maybe the bonus is designed to serve as an incentive to do X. In this latter case, the bonus would more than offset the drag and be accretive to the pro forma, which would mean that every sensible developer would now want to do X. More carrot, less stick.
One of the challenges with this hypothetical scenario is that, for such a bonus structure to work, you need to know the baseline that you’re bonusing against and you need to ensure that nobody gets the bonus unless they do the thing — the X. Using the above example, that means that the 100,000 sf needs to be fairly firm and that anything above that number only happens with the delivery of affordable housing.
Colliers recently hosted a webinar about inclusionary zoning here in Toronto. On the panel was Jeremiah Shamess (SVP at Colliers / moderator), David Bronskill (partner at Goodmans), Giulio Cescato (senior planner at IBI Group), and Richard Witt (principal at BDP Quadrangle). I wasn’t able to attend (either because of a critical meeting or because I was off attending to a gluttonous lunch burrito), but the slides are now available online. I was going through them this morning and I came across this chart from NBLC:
What you are seeing here is a comparison between a typical market development before IZ and a development after IZ. As you can see, soft costs remain the same, hard costs remain the same, and the profit margin remains the same. What changes is the overall revenue. Market revenue goes down because you now have fewer market-rate units and a new IZ revenue is added, which is the revenue generated from the addition of affordable units to the project.
But when you add up the market revenue and the IZ revenue, you don’t get back to the same economic equilibrium. In other words, there has been a destruction of value, and so something is going to have to give in order for this project to pencil and remain financeable. Otherwise, no development will take place. This shortfall is the red box area in the above graph that says, “impact of inclusionary zoning.”
We have discussed this red box gap a lot on the blog, because how you think this gap gets filled might determine how you think of inclusionary zoning as a policy tool. In this particular instance/graph, the gap is filled by a reduction in the value of the land. Everything else remains static. So what is effectively happening in this model is that the landowner, who has decided to sell their land to the above developer, is now the one who has to indirectly pay for this new affordable housing.
This may seem like a sensible way to go about it. I mean, people who own land must be rich. Let’s make them pay. But is this actually what is going to happen in practice and over extended periods of time? Soft costs — things like development charges — are always going up. Why aren’t land values perpetually declining in order to offset these additional costs? It is largely because market revenues have also been increasing. Housing keeps getting more expensive. And that is what has been keeping the market going.
I suspect that over an extended period of time, the same thing will happen here.
Today, the province of Ontario responded (maybe not to my post) by publishing this Housing Affordability Task Force report. In it, are 55 recommendations to improve overall housing supply across the province, with the end goal of adding 1.5 million homes over the next 10 years.
I’m still making my way through the report, but the recommendations can basically be grouped into these five main buckets (taken verbatim from this press release):
Make changes to planning policies and zoning to allow for greater density and increase the variety of housing.
Reduce and streamline urban design rules to lower costs of development.
Depoliticize the approvals process to address NIMBYism and cut red tape to speed up housing.
Prevent abuse of the appeal process and address the backlog at the Ontario Land Tribunal by prioritizing cases that increase housing.
Align efforts between all levels of government to incentivize more housing.
Reform is badly needed. And I have gone on and on and on and on over the years about a number of the problems associated with how we build new homes and how we expect them to suddenly become more affordable.
Still, I think that most of the general public would be shocked to learn how long things take, how complicated we have decided to make land use approvals, and how a single person with a vested interested in seeing no development can hold up the delivery of thousands of new homes.
Progress is measured in years and decades. Months simply evaporate while you wait for the next PDF document to grant you access to some other labyrinthian planning hurdle. It doesn’t need to be this way.
