Earlier this month, Howard Marks published a memo called "Sea Change", where he argued, among other things, that it is "nearly impossible to overstate the influence of declining [interest] rates over the last four decades." In fact, he goes on to say that he would be "surprised if 40 years of declining interest rates didn't play the greatest role of all" in the success that investors have seen since the 1980s. Of course, the reason the memo is called "Sea Change" is because his overarching point is that this tailwind is now over.

Let's consider this in the context of commercial real estate. If you bought a real asset at a 4% cap rate (calculated by dividing net operating income by the price of the asset) and were able to put debt on it at say 3%, you would be receiving positive leverage. Your cost of debt is less than the yield that your asset is generating, and so you are in effect magnifying your returns.

Now let's imagine a scenario where interest rates decline even further and somebody could put debt on this same asset at 2%. This is likely to put downward pressure on the cap rate, meaning that somebody might be willing to pay more for the same amount of yield. That is, they're willing to accept a lower yield. This phenomenon is what Howard is describing in his memo. Declining interest rates tend to create upward pressure on asset values. And in the world of real estate, this is referred to as a compression of cap rates.

But what happens when things go the other way? Well if you had the same real asset generating a 4% yield, but now the only debt you can find is at 7%, then you are in a scenario where, unless you can afford to pay with all cash, you will be receiving negative leverage. Your cost of debt is greater than the yield that your asset is generating. And that's the thing about leverage: it cuts both ways. It can magnify your returns, but it will also magnify any losses.

If the only debt that you can find for your asset is now at 7%, then your 4% cap rate is almost certainly going to need to widen/increase. That is, investors are going to want to pay less for the exact same income stream. This is significantly less fun than cap rate compression, where values just seem to always go up. But, it does also create new opportunities for well-capitalized investors.

All of this is playing out right now. And it is part of the "sea change" that Howard has called.

Sometimes I stop and think to myself, "my god, I've been writing my daily blog for over 9 years. That's a huge commitment. Should I stop? Is it really worth it?"

But of course I do think it is worth it, mostly because I enjoy writing, I enjoy thinking about things, and I enjoy connecting with people through this blog. I don't want to stop. It's perhaps also important for me to keep in mind that 9 years maybe isn't all that long.

I read this FT article today about investor Howard Marks. Marks is co-founder of Oaktree Capital Management, a person with billions of dollars, and the author of a popular investing memo (200,000+ subscribers) that I generally never miss. And after reading about his backstory, I now feel very much like a blogging baby:

He began writing the memos in 1990, initially sending them by post to Oaktree’s 50 or so clients. For the first 10 years, “I never had one response,” he says. And then, on January 2 2000, Marks distributed a memo called “bubble.com”, in which he made the “overwhelming” case for “an overheated, speculative market in technology, internet and telecommunications stocks”, similar to past manias such as the 18th-century South Sea Bubble. The memo “had two virtues”, says Marks. “It was right and it was right quickly.” The technology-heavy Nasdaq index slumped four-fifths from peak to trough between March 2000 and October 2002. “After 10 years, I became an overnight success.”

I have no particular end goal in mind for this blog. I have no need to become an overnight success. My plan is to just continue writing as an adjunct to all of the other things I do. However, I am attracted to the value of discipline, compounding consistency, and long-term thinking.

It's not easy doing something for a decade and having nobody respond. At least with this blog, I get the occasional heckler telling me that I'm a greedy developer out to destroy our cities.

P.S.: If you're into longish memos about investing, I would encourage you to check out Marks' latest memo about what really matters. In it, he talks about why short-term events -- such as, interest rates might do this -- are by far the least important thing to focus on.

Earlier this month, Howard Marks published a memo called "Sea Change", where he argued, among other things, that it is "nearly impossible to overstate the influence of declining [interest] rates over the last four decades." In fact, he goes on to say that he would be "surprised if 40 years of declining interest rates didn't play the greatest role of all" in the success that investors have seen since the 1980s. Of course, the reason the memo is called "Sea Change" is because his overarching point is that this tailwind is now over.

Let's consider this in the context of commercial real estate. If you bought a real asset at a 4% cap rate (calculated by dividing net operating income by the price of the asset) and were able to put debt on it at say 3%, you would be receiving positive leverage. Your cost of debt is less than the yield that your asset is generating, and so you are in effect magnifying your returns.

Now let's imagine a scenario where interest rates decline even further and somebody could put debt on this same asset at 2%. This is likely to put downward pressure on the cap rate, meaning that somebody might be willing to pay more for the same amount of yield. That is, they're willing to accept a lower yield. This phenomenon is what Howard is describing in his memo. Declining interest rates tend to create upward pressure on asset values. And in the world of real estate, this is referred to as a compression of cap rates.

But what happens when things go the other way? Well if you had the same real asset generating a 4% yield, but now the only debt you can find is at 7%, then you are in a scenario where, unless you can afford to pay with all cash, you will be receiving negative leverage. Your cost of debt is greater than the yield that your asset is generating. And that's the thing about leverage: it cuts both ways. It can magnify your returns, but it will also magnify any losses.

If the only debt that you can find for your asset is now at 7%, then your 4% cap rate is almost certainly going to need to widen/increase. That is, investors are going to want to pay less for the exact same income stream. This is significantly less fun than cap rate compression, where values just seem to always go up. But, it does also create new opportunities for well-capitalized investors.

All of this is playing out right now. And it is part of the "sea change" that Howard has called.

Sometimes I stop and think to myself, "my god, I've been writing my daily blog for over 9 years. That's a huge commitment. Should I stop? Is it really worth it?"

But of course I do think it is worth it, mostly because I enjoy writing, I enjoy thinking about things, and I enjoy connecting with people through this blog. I don't want to stop. It's perhaps also important for me to keep in mind that 9 years maybe isn't all that long.

I read this FT article today about investor Howard Marks. Marks is co-founder of Oaktree Capital Management, a person with billions of dollars, and the author of a popular investing memo (200,000+ subscribers) that I generally never miss. And after reading about his backstory, I now feel very much like a blogging baby:

He began writing the memos in 1990, initially sending them by post to Oaktree’s 50 or so clients. For the first 10 years, “I never had one response,” he says. And then, on January 2 2000, Marks distributed a memo called “bubble.com”, in which he made the “overwhelming” case for “an overheated, speculative market in technology, internet and telecommunications stocks”, similar to past manias such as the 18th-century South Sea Bubble. The memo “had two virtues”, says Marks. “It was right and it was right quickly.” The technology-heavy Nasdaq index slumped four-fifths from peak to trough between March 2000 and October 2002. “After 10 years, I became an overnight success.”

I have no particular end goal in mind for this blog. I have no need to become an overnight success. My plan is to just continue writing as an adjunct to all of the other things I do. However, I am attracted to the value of discipline, compounding consistency, and long-term thinking.

It's not easy doing something for a decade and having nobody respond. At least with this blog, I get the occasional heckler telling me that I'm a greedy developer out to destroy our cities.

P.S.: If you're into longish memos about investing, I would encourage you to check out Marks' latest memo about what really matters. In it, he talks about why short-term events -- such as, interest rates might do this -- are by far the least important thing to focus on.