Past performance, we are often told, is not necessarily indicative of future results. At the same time, history has a funny way of repeating itself. I recently stumbled upon this research paper by Marc Francke (University of Amsterdam) and Matthijs Korevaar (Erasmus School of Economics) looking at the impact of pandemics on housing markets. More specifically, it looks at the impacts of the bubonic plague on 17th-century Amsterdam and of cholera on 19th-century Paris. Here's an excerpt that summarizes what they found:

Our analyses for both cities point to substantial impacts of pandemics on property prices. We find that sales prices respond negatively to outbreaks, in particular in heavily affected areas, and that responses are short-lived, with the effects on sale prices being particularly significant in the first six months of an epidemic. Evidence from aggregate house and rent price indices suggests a smaller negative impact on rent prices. Amsterdam and Paris were very resilient to these outbreaks, with population and house price growth quickly reverting to prior trends.

This paper was first published at the beginning of 2021. A lot has changed since then and, in some ways, their findings now seem obvious. There was still a great deal of uncertainty in the market 12 months ago. While it seems like eons ago, I remember our team having discussions around when would be the right time to launch sales for One Delisle. Of course, 2021 turned out to be a record-setting year for housing and that includes the core/urban housing that the media was quick to write off at the onset of COVID.

This is not to say that certain things haven't changed or that there won't be further changes -- both positive and negative -- that come out of this. To give one just example, we all continue to hear anecdotal evidence that a lot of tech talent would now prefer to be in cities like Miami over San Francisco. (I'm not tech talent, but this would be my strong preference.) Did the pandemic help fuel this? Probably. It opened a door for the people who no longer wanted to live in a city with such a supply-constrained housing market. (I'm sure there were other reasons, too.)

These things, of course, happen. Cities are powerfully resilient, but they still need to compete. The bigger point is that cities continue to be our greatest centers of opportunity. And here we have centuries of data and housing records to support the fact that opportunity is both a powerful motivator and a centralizing force for urbanization. This is true even in the face of things like pestilence.

Happy new year, everyone. I think there's a lot to look forward to in 2022, including far less talk about pandemics and hopefully far more talk of places like Miami.

Photo by Adrien Olichon on Unsplash

I was reading Aaron Renn’s post this morning on America’s vacant housing challenge and I was reminded of the stark contrast between what we are experiencing here in Toronto and what the US is experiencing in a lot of its coastal cities, compared to what is happening in many legacy cities in the US. The former industrial centers. In this latter case, the discussion is around neighborhoods reaching a tipping point in terms of vacant homes and then spiralling out of control. Below is an excerpt from a study that Renn cites in his post. It is from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and it’s called “The Empty House Next Door.” The above chart should also tell you a lot about the magnitude of this problem.

Hypervacancy has been rising steadily in legacy cities since the 1990s. Although only one out of sixteen census tracts in Cleveland was hypervacant in 1990, by 2010, one out of two tracts in that city had reached hypervacancy. When vacancies rise above approximately 20 percent of an area’s total properties, the number of vacant buildings and lots may continue to grow indefinitely. Although vacancies rarely reach 100 percent—because even the most distressed neighbor- hood may have a few long-term owners—the market effectively ceases to function. Houses sell, if they sell at all, only to investors at rock bottom prices while the neighborhoods become areas of concentrated poverty, unemployment, and health problems.

You were probably expecting some kind of temporary housing solution. Because that’s certainly what I was thinking when Big Ben Myers tweeted me this article yesterday. But it turns out that in D.C., “pop-up housing” has come to mean what you see in the above photo – a pencil thin house rising amongst a bunch of low-rise rowhouses.

Local bloggers are calling it a “middle finger to taste and scale”, but it’s happening because of what appears to be a real housing supply shortgage in the District. And it’s been said to be hurting not only housing affordability, but also exacerbating income inequality. 

However, it’s become a threeway debate. You have people worried about aesthetics, local homeowners and residents worried about their own interests, and you have people worried about the overall health of the housing market. As I’ve argued before here on ATC, too much protectionism is often a bad thing for housing markets.

But policy makers in the District appear to be responding in exactly that way, by clamping down on pop-up housing, as well as on accessory dwellings such as nanny flats (which I’m assuming are similar to what we would call laneway houses here in Toronto).

I can certainly understand the concerns, but I think that cities need to find that fine line between preservation and growth. Because banning pop-up housing is only addressing the symptom. It doesn’t address the underlying cause, which, in this case, seems to be a housing market in search of more housing options.

Update: This post was updated to give credit to Big Ben Myers for the article.

Image: Washington Fine Properties via Citylab