Daily insights for city builders, delivered every morning at 6 AM ET. I’m Brandon Donnelly — a Toronto-based real estate developer and founder of Globizen. I’ve been writing here since 2013.

Category: Economics

  • Comparing the weekly earnings of Canada’s visible minorities to white people

    We just finished up three days of snowboarding and skiing in Tremblant, Quebec and we’re now in Montreal closing out the long weekend. I am arguably Toronto’s greatest fan and supporter, but I continue to admit that Montreal is the coolest city in Canada.

    In other news, Theresa Qiu and Grant Schellenberg recently authored a Statistics Canada report looking at the weekly earnings of visible minorities and white people across the country. The study focuses on Canadian-born individuals aged 25 to 44 who were gainfully employed and making money in 2015.

    The reason why they isolated the study to Canadian-born visible minorities is that they wanted to eliminate the noise around new immigrants who may be struggling with the language(s), the recognition of their foreign credentials, or some other variable.

    In this case, every individual that factors into the study was born in Canada and, in theory, had access to similar sorts of opportunities. Of course, we know this isn’t always the case, but it’s an attempt an equal baseline.

    The findings are pretty interesting.

    Korean, Japanese, and South Asian men all tend to earn more than white males (which formed the baseline for the study). More than 60% of Chinese and Korean men also have a bachelor’s degree or higher, whereas only 24% of white males are in the same position.

    This is an important data point because we know that economic outcomes tend be positively correlated with educational attainment. The benefits of education also tend to compound later in life and this study only focuses on people aged 25 to 44. So the spreads could widen.

    One the factors that is surely influencing the above findings is that visible minorities are overwhelmingly urban. About 60% of visible minorities in Canada live in just three cities: Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. This compares to only 27% of white people.

    Again, an important data point given that people in big cities tend to earn more than those in smaller communities.

    For the full study, click here.

  • The inclusionary zoning shortfall

    Colliers recently hosted a webinar about inclusionary zoning here in Toronto. On the panel was Jeremiah Shamess (SVP at Colliers / moderator), David Bronskill (partner at Goodmans), Giulio Cescato (senior planner at IBI Group), and Richard Witt (principal at BDP Quadrangle). I wasn’t able to attend (either because of a critical meeting or because I was off attending to a gluttonous lunch burrito), but the slides are now available online. I was going through them this morning and I came across this chart from NBLC:

    What you are seeing here is a comparison between a typical market development before IZ and a development after IZ. As you can see, soft costs remain the same, hard costs remain the same, and the profit margin remains the same. What changes is the overall revenue. Market revenue goes down because you now have fewer market-rate units and a new IZ revenue is added, which is the revenue generated from the addition of affordable units to the project.

    But when you add up the market revenue and the IZ revenue, you don’t get back to the same economic equilibrium. In other words, there has been a destruction of value, and so something is going to have to give in order for this project to pencil and remain financeable. Otherwise, no development will take place. This shortfall is the red box area in the above graph that says, “impact of inclusionary zoning.”

    We have discussed this red box gap a lot on the blog, because how you think this gap gets filled might determine how you think of inclusionary zoning as a policy tool. In this particular instance/graph, the gap is filled by a reduction in the value of the land. Everything else remains static. So what is effectively happening in this model is that the landowner, who has decided to sell their land to the above developer, is now the one who has to indirectly pay for this new affordable housing.

    This may seem like a sensible way to go about it. I mean, people who own land must be rich. Let’s make them pay. But is this actually what is going to happen in practice and over extended periods of time? Soft costs — things like development charges — are always going up. Why aren’t land values perpetually declining in order to offset these additional costs? It is largely because market revenues have also been increasing. Housing keeps getting more expensive. And that is what has been keeping the market going.

    I suspect that over an extended period of time, the same thing will happen here.

  • Protection against risk of expropriation

    Property rights, whether for real world things or for digital things, are the foundation of developed economies. Because if you don’t feel like your property is going to be safe and secure, why would you bother investing and trying to accumulate assets?

    Above is a chart I found, in this great thought piece by Ryan Goldman, showing the direct relationship between “protection against risk of expropriation” and GDP per capita. The more protection, the higher the GDP.

    This is, of course, fundamental to the way we live our lives offline. But it is also becoming increasingly important in the way we live our lives online. Because we now have digital assets that people actually care about owning and protecting. You know, like pictures of apes.

    This market is only going to continue to grow and the above relationship between rights and economic development will certainly hold true. But I think the big question is whether there will be more distributed and equitable access to opportunities in this emerging world.

    I hope that will be the case.

  • Price of shelter increased 4.1% — or was it more?

    The latest US consumer price index report was recently published and for the 12-month period ending December 2021, the all items index rose 7.0%. This is the largest 12-month increase since June 1982. Here’s a breakdown:

    • Gasoline (all types): +49.6%
    • Used cars and truck: +37.3%
    • Meats/fish/poultry/eggs: +12.5%
    • New cars: +11.8%
    • Food at home: +6.5%
    • Electricity: +6.3%
    • Food away from home: +6.0%
    • Apparel: +5.8%
    • Transportation: +4.2%
    • Shelter: +4.1%

    The obvious standouts here are the price of gasoline and the price of used cars and trucks. Too much demand and not enough supply, it would seem. But the other conspicuous line item for me is shelter at only 4.1%. Is that it?

    As Charlie Bilello points out in his latest newsletter, US rents were estimated to be up about 17.8% in 2021 (the highest increase on record according to Apartment List) and the Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index was similarly up about 19% year-over-year.

    I also just glanced at the latest Urbanation rental report that came out today, and condominium rents were up 10.8% year-over-year here in the Greater Toronto Area. So I don’t know about this 4.1% number. But maybe I just missed something in the fine print.

  • My predictions for 2022

    As promised, below is a list of some of my predictions for this coming year. I have tried to be both punchier and more precise in my prognostications; because, well, obvious predictions are boring and precision will allow me to better evaluate my thinking at the end of the year. So here goes.

    1. 2022 will be the year that COVID-19 becomes endemic and finally fizzles out to a point where it no longer factors into our decision making in the same way that it has for most people over the last two years or so. I think this will happen by as early as the summer.
    2. As a result, I think the majority of people will be back in their offices by this September at the very latest, with many coming back much earlier. The whole hybrid/flexible work thing won’t completely disappear, but the majority of people who used to work in offices will be back.
    3. Recreational/fringe residential real estate will soften in 2022 as a result of 1) its tremendous run-up during this pandemic and 2) the renewed pull of urban/office life. Conversely, urban apartment rents will continue to rise and eventually surpass their pre-COVID levels. The SF Bay Area could be one exception.
    4. The explosion of travel that I thought was going to happen in 2021, will truly happen this year. The summer will mark its official return, with European travel volumes (to give just one example) returning to their pre-COVID levels.
    5. We will see meaningful efforts to further breakdown the hegemony of single-family zoning throughout many North American cities. This has been building for a number of years and I think we will see some tipping point-like moments in 2022. Specifically, expanded permissions for multi-unit housing and greater densities.
    6. I wish I could say that autonomous vehicles are destined to do something truly remarkable this year, but I think we are still a few years out (2024-2025?) before a large chunk of us are ride-hailing AVs. But on a related note, I do think that Uber will come into its own this year and finally become profitable (and not just with adjusted profits).
    7. Public transit ridership will, unfortunately, remain depressed and below its pre-COVID levels for this entire year. The beneficiaries of this will continue to be cars (not good), bikes, and micro-mobility solutions like e-scooters.
    8. 2021 was a huge year for NFTs and other fun stuff like digital fashion. Given these trends, I believe there will be growing demand from people to better integrate their digital and physical lives through technologies like augmented reality. Snap has been at the forefront of this space for many years and 2022 will be an important year for its Spectacles (AR glasses). But Apple and others will also make major announcements.
    9. Miami’s ascent as an important tech hub will get interrupted by questions surrounding the climate crisis and its own resilience. At the time of writing this post, the price of carbon on the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is about €80 per tonne. I think we will see it break €125 per tonne this year, and possibly go even higher.
    10. Ethereum, Bitcoin, and Solana (in this order) will be the top three cryptocurrencies according to market cap by the end of the year. At the time of writing this post, their market caps are $446 billion, $895 billion, and $55 billion, respectively. I am also expecting some breakout web3 consumer applications that will push, maybe, 40% of Canadians and Americans into the crypto space.

    Photo by Dave Xu on Unsplash

  • Self-expression and community move online

    The New Consumer, in collaboration with Coefficient Capital, just published its latest Consumer Trends report, which you can download for free over here (registration required). There’s a lot in the report to flip through, but I thought I would share these two slides:

    Generation Z and Millennials now make up ~40% of the US population and they are soon entering their prime consumer spending years. What’s noteworthy about these charts, but perhaps not surprising, is the extent in which self-expression and a sense of community have shifted from offline to online.

    Very few Boomers, at least according to this report, feel like themselves online. But nearly half of Gen Z feel most like themselves online. What it means to be part of a “community” has also shifted dramatically, with more if it happening online or at least partially online.

    All of this ties into what happened earlier in the week with Nike announcing the acquisition of RTFKT Studios. As I mentioned in this post, the so-called metaverse doesn’t necessarily have to mean VR goggles and living in video games. It can simply mean placing value on the parts of our lives that are now digital. The above two charts suggest that many are already doing this.

    Of course, what all of this means for our physical lives is an important question. Josh Stephens recently argued, over at Planetizen, that the metaverse is going to be really bad for cities. The more we focus on seductive virtual worlds, the less we will focus on our physical spaces. I get this logic.

    But again, I think it depends on how you define the metaverse. And I think VR headsets are a pretty narrow definition. I am both a lover of technology and a lover of cities. And throughout this pandemic I have been fairly consistent in writing about the resiliency of cities. Nothing in this post changes that for me.

  • Does new housing supply need better economic incentives?

    I watched a bit of the English leadership debate the other night. Eventually I got frustrated and went to bed, but I understand that housing affordability and overall affordability were important topics.

    What is clear, to anyone who cares to look, is that in most big cities we are not building enough new housing. According to the above Economist article (linked in the above tweet), the “rich world” has seen new housing production drop by about 50% (relative to population) since the 1960s.

    There are many reasons for this. But part of the problem is bureaucracy. Things move exceedingly slow. And another part of the problem is community opposition. Urban sprawl can be easier to swallow because there’s an out-of-sight-out-of-mind phenomenon at work. Stuff may be happening, but it’s not happening in my backyard.

    But now that so much of what we do is centered around intensifying existing neighborhoods, we are faced with a battle between the incumbents (existing residents) and the future residents of a community that don’t have nearly as much say — if any at all.

    What I like about the Economist article is their line of thinking for how to address this dynamic, which, at the end of the day, is rooted in what I will call expected selfishness.

    The approach is around aligning incentives. How could we better structure the delivery of new housing so that more stakeholders stand to directly benefit? Because as we have seen with laneway housing here in Toronto, homeowners will gladly build in their backyard when they stand to benefit directly.

  • How clustering makes us all more productive and innovative

    Earlier this year, Enrico Moretti, who is a professor at UC Berkeley, published this research paper looking at the effect of high-tech clusters on productivity and innovation. (I am unclear if there is any relationship to the Italian brewing company Birra Moretti.)

    One of the things he looks at in the paper is the decline of Kodak. Headquartered in Rochester, New York, Kodak famously missed the transition to digital photography. And so by the late 1990s, they were forced to start letting people go. The result was an almost 50% decline in the size of the entire “high-tech cluster” in Rochester.

    But what Moretti goes on to test in his paper is the impact that this employment decline had on productivity and innovation outside of Kodak and outside of the photography sector (but within Rochester). And what he found was that between 1996 and 2007, the productivity of non-Kodak inventors dropped by about 20%!

    This, of course, is one of the great features of cities. Even if you’re not working at some big company with lots of smart people, just being in the same city, on the same block, or within the same office building, can make you more productive. It turns out that business ecosystems are pretty interconnected. Spillovers are important.

    For more on this topic, check out this recent Wired article by Viviane Callier. In it she makes the case that remote work is going to negatively impact productivity and innovation over the long run.

    Photo by Yassine Khalfalli on Unsplash

  • The World After Capital

    Years ago I wrote about a book that venture capitalist Albert Wenger was writing — in public I would add — called The World After Capital. The public bit is interesting. As he was writing the book over the last ten years or so, he did it in public and published drafts along the way. This allowed him to get feedback, learn things, and revise accordingly. He calls this a “knowledge loop” and it ties in nicely with some of the topics that he covers in the book.

    The first focus of the book is on explaining that capital (which was a constraint of industrialization) is no longer scarce. This isn’t necessarily true everywhere, but he argues that it is true in the developed world. What is instead scarce today is attention. That is our defining constraint as we continue to move into the Knowledge Age. The second focus of his book is on how he thinks we should best respond to these changes, as well as to the limitations of capitalism.

    I haven’t read the book yet (only scanned it), but it’s now in my queue. Normally my queue consists of a stack of partially read books next to my bed. But this one is digital only for the time being. If you’d like to read a digital copy (there’s a downloadable PDF), go here. Apparently there will also be a hard copy available sometime later this year or early next year.

  • Our intergenerational wealth gaps

    This is a chart by economist Gray Kimbrough from 2019. I recently saw it resurface and so I thought I would reshare it here on the blog.

    The y-axis is the percentage of US household wealth (by demographic cohort). And the x-axis is median cohort age. So one way to look at this chart is as follows.

    When the median age of a Baby Boomer was 35 (which happened in 1990), they owned about 21% of US household wealth.

    When the median age of a Gen Xer was 35 (which happened in 2008), they owned about 9% of US household wealth.

    Millennials haven’t yet hit a median age of 35, but in 2019 they owned about 3.2% of US household wealth.

    Of course, one thing to keep in mind is that these demographic cohorts are not the same size. In 1990, Boomers represented 31% of the US population. And in 2008, Gen Xers were only 22% of the population.

    But even if you normalize, there are some intergenerational wealth gaps here.